Military helicopters do not remain in the configuration in which they entered service. Software changes, avionics are upgraded, mission systems evolve, new weapons and sensors are introduced, threats change and operational experience drives the development of new tactics. A modern military helicopter may remain in service for several decades and undergo significant capability changes during that period.
The synthetic training system supporting it needs to keep pace. Unfortunately, this is where traditional simulator procurement can struggle. A requirement is defined, specifications are agreed, funding is approved and a simulator is developed and accepted into service. That process can take years, particularly for complex military aircraft, and by the time the device is operational the front-line aircraft may already have moved on.
This creates a familiar problem. The simulator remains valuable for procedures, emergencies and elements of aircraft handling, but gradually becomes less representative of the aircraft and operational environment in which crews are actually expected to fight or operate. Updating it then becomes another engineering and commercial programme, while the aircraft, threat and tactics continue to develop in parallel.
For military helicopter training, particularly collective and tactical training, there is a strong argument for treating synthetic training as a continuously delivered capability rather than a piece of equipment that is purchased, accepted and periodically upgraded.
Not Every Training Requirement Needs the Same Simulator
There is no single level of simulation fidelity appropriate to every military helicopter training task. A device intended to teach aircraft handling, emergencies or complex aircraft procedures may require extremely accurate controls, systems representation, cockpit geometry and, in some cases, motion. If the training objective is to practise an engine failure or a complicated aircraft-system malfunction, accurate representation of the aircraft itself is fundamental to the value of the training.
Collective tactical training presents a different requirement. Once a competent crew is trying to plan and execute a multi-aircraft mission, much of the training value comes from what is happening outside its own cockpit. Other aircraft need to behave credibly, threats need to react, communications need to work, rear crew and mission commanders need to participate, and decisions made by one part of the force need to have consequences elsewhere in the exercise.
At that point, spending a disproportionate amount of the available budget reproducing every physical detail of the cockpit may add relatively little to the training objective. A representative cockpit using commercial controls, VR/MR or other visual systems may provide sufficient fidelity while allowing significantly more investment to be placed into the wider synthetic environment.
This is particularly important for customers with constrained budgets. A single extremely high-fidelity simulator may provide excellent training to one crew at a time, but a network of less expensive devices can potentially allow several aircraft, rear crew and command elements to train together. Neither approach is inherently better; they are solving different training problems. The training objective should determine the equipment rather than the equipment determining what training can be delivered.
Train the Mission, Not Just the Aircraft
Military helicopters rarely operate independently. Even a relatively straightforward troop insertion may involve several aircraft, different crew positions, ground forces, command elements and supporting assets. More complex operations can involve attack, lift and reconnaissance helicopters, ISR, fires, unmanned systems and several layers of command and control.
Replicating that environment with live aircraft is expensive and often difficult. Aircraft availability, fuel, maintenance, airspace, weather, personnel and supporting assets all have to align before the training event can take place. For smaller helicopter forces, assembling enough serviceable aircraft to conduct a large collective exercise can itself be a significant challenge.
A networked synthetic environment allows much of that complexity to be generated without physically assembling every participant. Two aircraft can train together or a considerably larger package can be constructed involving multiple helicopter types, rear crew, mission-system operators, command functions and simulated supporting assets. The exercise can then be repeated, modified or stopped at the point where the useful training has occurred.
This is where synthetic training moves beyond being a substitute for aircraft hours. It can create training opportunities that would be extremely difficult to generate routinely in live flying, particularly when the objective is to develop planning, communications, command, tactical decision-making and interoperability rather than simply practise aircraft handling.
The ability to fail safely also matters. A crew can make a poor tactical decision in a synthetic environment and be allowed to experience the consequences. The exercise can then be reset and repeated with a different approach. Reproducing that learning process in an aircraft is considerably more difficult because an instructor will often have to intervene before the consequences of a bad decision become apparent.
Network Beyond the Individual Training Centre
Modern networking also removes the requirement for every participant to be physically located in the same building. Compatible training devices can potentially participate in a common synthetic exercise from different locations, allowing specialist capabilities, other services or international partners to join the same mission.
For rotary-wing forces this has considerable potential. A helicopter unit does not necessarily need to own every synthetic representation required for a complex exercise. Another organisation may provide a different aircraft type, an ISR capability, a command element or another specialist function and connect it into the same environment.
The same principle can apply internationally. Forces that expect to operate together can train together without routinely deploying aircraft and personnel across borders simply to create the required exercise structure. Live multinational training remains essential, but synthetic networking can allow considerably more preparation and repetition before the expensive live phase begins.
The technology required to do this is no longer particularly exotic. The greater challenge is often achieving compatibility between systems that were originally procured independently and were never designed to communicate with one another.
That should influence how new synthetic capability is designed. Open architecture and the ability to integrate with other systems can ultimately provide more military value than a highly capable standalone device that cannot interact with anything outside its own training centre.
The Training Environment Has to Keep Changing
The synthetic environment should also reflect the operational world rather than remain tied to the threat picture that existed when the simulator was originally specified. New air-defence systems appear, electronic warfare develops, unmanned aircraft become increasingly common and operational experience changes the way crews use terrain, communications and mission systems.
Software-based training environments provide an opportunity to respond much more quickly. Threat systems can be modified, operating areas changed and scenarios rebuilt without replacing the physical training device. New aircraft or capabilities can be introduced progressively, while existing representations can be adjusted as front-line procedures and tactics evolve.
This becomes particularly valuable when operational lessons need to be incorporated quickly. If crews identify a new threat or tactical problem during deployed operations, there is considerable value in being able to reproduce that problem synthetically and expose other crews to it before they encounter it for real.
The end users therefore need to remain involved throughout the life of the system. Pilots, rear crew, instructors and operational commanders quickly identify what produces useful training and what does not. Their involvement should not end when the initial simulator specification is signed. They should be able to influence the training environment continuously as operational requirements change.
Commercial Technology Has Changed What Is Possible
There was a time when sophisticated visual systems, computing and simulation hardware were almost exclusively the domain of specialist defence manufacturers. That is no longer the case. Commercial gaming, VR, graphics processing and networking have developed at a pace that traditional military procurement has struggled to match.
This does not mean that consumer equipment can simply be placed in a room and described as a military simulator. The training system still requires proper design, aircraft representation, instructor functionality, scenario development and an understanding of the training objectives. Where appropriate, systems also need to be controlled and validated to ensure that negative training is not introduced.
What commercial technology does provide is another set of tools. High-resolution VR and MR headsets, increasingly capable graphics engines, relatively inexpensive computing and representative controls allow useful training devices to be developed at a fraction of the cost traditionally associated with full-flight simulation.
For smaller military customers, this can fundamentally change what is affordable. Instead of concentrating the entire synthetic budget on one device, it becomes possible to create several networked training positions and include pilots, rear crew and command functions. The system can then be expanded progressively as the requirement and budget develop.
The important discipline is to avoid being distracted by the technology itself. VR is not automatically the answer, nor is full motion. The question remains what the student or crew needs to learn and what level of representation is necessary to achieve that objective.
A Different Way of Buying Synthetic Training
There is also a commercial question. If the customer purchases and owns a simulator, the customer ultimately inherits the problem of keeping it current. Every significant aircraft modification or technology change potentially creates another requirement to modify the training device, and those changes compete with other defence priorities for funding.
An alternative is to purchase training capability rather than the equipment itself. Under this model, the provider owns, operates, sustains and develops the synthetic system while the military customer purchases the training capacity it requires. The provider therefore carries much of the technology and obsolescence risk.
This changes the commercial incentive. If the system falls significantly behind the aircraft or no longer provides useful training, the customer has less reason to continue buying training from it. The provider therefore has a direct incentive to keep the capability relevant, incorporate useful new technology and respond to the requirements of the crews using it.
It also allows capacity to be purchased according to requirement. A relatively small unit may only need a limited number of training days during routine operations, while a major exercise or pre-deployment period could require substantially greater capacity. The customer pays for the training required rather than owning a large facility simply to guarantee access during those periods.
For countries with limited defence budgets, this can be particularly attractive. Capital expenditure is reduced, technology risk sits largely with the provider and the military does not need to maintain a specialist engineering organisation simply to support equipment that exists only for training.
Synthetic and Live Training Should Support Each Other
None of this removes the requirement for live flying. Military helicopter crews ultimately need to operate real aircraft in real environments, and there are elements of flying, crew cooperation and tactical judgement that cannot be completely reproduced synthetically.
The purpose of synthetic training is to make those live hours more productive. Crews can arrive at the aircraft having already planned the mission, rehearsed procedures, experienced the scenario and identified likely problems. The live sortie can then concentrate on the aspects of the mission that genuinely require an aircraft.
The same principle applies to large exercises. A complex mission can be rehearsed synthetically several times before aircraft are committed. Crews can understand the plan, communications can be tested and obvious weaknesses identified without burning fuel or consuming aircraft life. When the live exercise takes place, expensive flying hours are being used to develop the elements that cannot be achieved elsewhere.
For customers operating small fleets, this can make the difference between conducting meaningful collective training regularly and only being able to afford it occasionally.
Synthetic Training Should Never Really Be Finished
The biggest mistake may be treating a military simulator as a finished product. The aircraft it supports will change throughout its life, as will the threats, tactics and technology surrounding it. A training system that remains static will inevitably become less relevant.
Synthetic training should therefore be considered an evolving part of the operational training system. Hardware can be replaced when better technology becomes available, software can be updated as aircraft and threats change, and scenarios can be modified continuously to reflect what crews actually need to practise.
That requires a different mindset from both customer and provider. Instead of asking what simulator should be purchased to satisfy today’s specification, the better question may be what training capability needs to exist over the next ten or twenty years and how it can be kept relevant throughout that period.
The measure of a synthetic training system is not how impressive it looked when it was accepted into service. It is whether the crews using it years later still believe that the training prepares them for the aircraft, threat and mission they will face when they leave the building.
HDP